

**MINORITY POLITICAL PARTIES IN EASTERN EUROPE:
ALBANIAN AND MAGYAR DIASPORA PARTIES COMPARED**

by

Eben Friedman*
Regional Representative
European Centre for Minority Issues
Regional Office Skopje
ul. Makedonija 29/4
1000 Skopje
MACEDONIA
Telephone: +389 (0)2 3215 637
Fax: +389 (0)2 3215 639
E-mail: friedman@ecmi.de

Prepared for delivery at the international interdisciplinary workshop
“Ethnic Mobilization in the New Europe,” Brussels, 21-22 April 2006

DRAFT

Not for publication or citation without express permission of author.

* The author wishes to thank Florian Bieber, Kata Eplényi, Mladen Momčilović, and Oleh Protsyk for their assistance in procuring documents referred to in this paper.

INTRODUCTION

Magyar and Albanian political parties: Apples and oranges?

Among the various manifestations of minority activism in societies with relatively free elections, the formation of ethnically based political parties ranks as one of the most visible as well as one of the most durable. Focusing primarily on the electoral programs of Magyar¹ and Albanian minority political parties, this paper offers a preliminary look at the ongoing Europeanization of minority politics in terms of two European populations with both a homeland state and a politically active ethnic diaspora living in multiple states adjacent to the homeland state. The selection of Magyar and Albanian political parties for comparison stems from considerations both objective and subjective, with the fact that Albanian as well as Magyar minorities have registered political subjects in countries adjacent to their respective homeland states falling solidly into the former category. Also contributing to the appropriateness of the comparison from a methodological standpoint is that the Republic of Serbia is home to Magyar and Albanian minorities which have founded their own political subjects. A further motivation for this comparison, however, was to subject to scrutiny my own prior impression from field research in Slovakia and Macedonia that Magyar political parties exhibit a variety of programmatic commitments lacking among Albanian political parties in areas not pertaining directly to issues of minority rights (see Friedman 2005: 387). Finally, and related to the previous point, I was interested to see where political parties of the ethnic Albanian diaspora in Eastern Europe would fall on the scale implicit in Christopher Lord's (1993: 9) assertion that "from a socio-cultural point of view, the Hungarians are broadly speaking attractive to those people in the West who are acting as role models and (perhaps more importantly) as sources of funds for minority parties, movements, foundations and so on. They are not illiterate heroin dealers, like some leaders of the Iraqi Kurds, or gun-toting revolutionaries like the Provisional IRA, but lucid and civilized Europeans, advancing a reasonable political position in a calm and rational manner."

¹ I use the term 'Magyar' as a designation of ethnicity without implications for citizenship.

Definitional issues

In accepting Donald Horowitz's (1985: 291) definition of an ethnically based party as a political party which "derives its support overwhelmingly from an identifiable ethnic group (or cluster of ethnic groups) and serves the interest of that group," I count as political parties some political organizations which contest elections but which would be defined in relevant national legislation as something other than a political party. A case in point is the Democratic Alliance of Magyars in Romania, which is technically a "political alliance" rather than a political party as such (see Official Gazette of Romania 1996, Chapter IV). The requirement that organizations included in the comparison contest elections, on the other hand, excludes perhaps most notably Magyar political formations in Ukraine, which have been effectively prevented from running candidates by legislation requiring that political parties gather ten thousand signatures in sixteen of the country's twenty-four administrative regions as a condition of registration (see Vidomosti Verhovnoï Rady 2001, Article 10). Also excluded by this criterion are political parties which have registered as such since the most recent elections, such as the (ethnic Albanian) New Democratic Forces in Macedonia.

In making determinations concerning the ethnic orientation of the parties included in the comparison, I have relied primarily on explicit references to a specific group, whether these are found in the name of the party (e.g., Magyar Coalition Party; Democratic Party of Albanians) or in the texts examined (e.g., the Democratic Union for Integration's reference to "[t]he will of the progressive forces that brought to radical change of the position of Albanians in Macedonia" (Baskhimi Demokratik për Integrim 2002)). While party names and mention of specific groups in party documents are largely sufficient for ascertaining ethnic orientation, the languages in which party documents are available provide another important indicator; even in the absence of other knowledge about a given political party, the availability of the party's electoral program only in a minority language leaves little room for doubt as to the ethnicity of the party's support base. Thus, relying *exclusively* on the language criterion, one Albanian political party each from Serbia and Macedonia could be categorized as an ethnic party (see Bashkimi Demokratik i Luginës 2004; Partia Demokratike Kombëtare 2003).

Selecting Magyar and Albanian minority political parties according to the criteria outlined above yields a total of fifteen political parties in four party systems

(counting Serbia and Montenegro separately). More specifically, the universe of comparison includes one Magyar political party each in the Slovak Republic and Romania, plus three such parties in Serbia, for a total of five Magyar parties. The remaining ten Albanian political parties are divided among Serbia² (four), Montenegro (two) and the Republic of Macedonia (four), with the number of parties actually included in the Albanian segment of the comparison reduced by two as a function of the availability of relevant materials from Democratic Party of Albanians (Serbia) and the Democratic Union of Montenegro. A further caveat concerns the types of documents used in the comparison: While most of the parties publish an electoral program, where no document bearing this or a similar name (e.g., 'platform') was available, I have made use of documents provided by the relevant parties in response to my request for an electoral program. Finally, while I have made use of the most recent documents available for the parties included in the comparison, the fact that the documents vary in age within a range of fifteen years likely accounts for some of the differences among them.

² Albanian political parties in Kosovo are not included in the comparison in the grounds that under UN Resolution 1244 the province holds elections independent of those in Serbia, functioning as an Albanian-majority party system.

Table 1. Magyar and Albanian minority political parties

Ethnicity	Country	Party name	Abbreviation (minority language)	Abbreviation (majority language)
Magyar	Slovakia	Magyar Coalition party	MKP	SMK
	Romania	Democratic Alliance of Magyars in Romania	RMDSZ	UDMR
	Serbia	Alliance of Vojvodina Magyars	VMSZ	SVM
	Serbia	Democratic Community of Vojvodina Magyars	VMDK	DZVM
	Serbia	Vojvodina Magyar Democratic Party	VMDP	DSVM
Albanian	Serbia	Party of Democratic Action	PVD	PDD
	Serbia	Democratic Union of the Valley	BDL	DUD
	Serbia	Movement for Democratic Progress	LPD	PDP
	Serbia	Democratic Party of Albanians	PDSH	DPA
	Montenegro	Democratic Union of Albanians	UDSH	DUA
	Montenegro	Democratic Union of Montenegro	LDMZ	DSCG
	Macedonia	Party for Democratic Prosperity	PPD	PDP
	Macedonia	Democratic Party of Albanians	PDSH	DPA
	Macedonia	Democratic Union for Integration	BDI	DUI
	Macedonia	National Democratic Party	PDK	NDP

Structure of the paper

This paper consists of two main substantive sections. In the first of these, I examine the ways in which Magyar and Albanian minority political parties make use of ideas about Europe and its political structures, standards, and values in their respective program documents. Beginning with Magyar political parties, I proceed country-by-country, preceding the documentary analysis with brief demographic and party profiles for each country examined. After treating Magyar political parties in Slovakia, Romania, and Serbia, I repeat the process with Albanian political parties in Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia.

The second substantive section provides a look at notions other than Europe which recur in the presentations of demands and goals by the parties included in the comparison. Proceeding thematically, I first treat external referents common to the programs of multiple political parties. Next, I examine parties' claims about the respective countries in which they operate and the use of those claims in framing political appeals. Rounding out the section, I attempt to trouble the distinction between external and internal appeals with reference to Albanian political parties'

discussion of the *Framework Agreement* in Macedonia. Finally, in the concluding section, I return briefly to the questions motivating the comparison, also attending to questions about whether a given minority tends to mobilize in a uniform way across all states in which it constitutes a numerically significant population and whether numerically significant minorities in a given state tend to mobilize in the same fashion.

POLITICAL USES OF “EUROPE”

The party programs reviewed below differ in the degree to which they target at least three distinct populations: voters belonging to the minority which the party in question aims to represent, the majority population of the country within which the party operates, and international observers. Whereas appeals to the party’s presumed ethnic constituency can be explained summarily with reference to the dynamics of electoral politics, addressing the majority population may serve the purpose not only of broadening the party’s electoral base, but also of engaging in dialogue with the government in power. International observers, on the other hand, may be targeted as potential sources of direct support, as well as in order to shame the government in power for not attending sufficiently to the situation of the minority in question.

Beyond the content of a party’s program, the languages in which a minority political party publishes its documents provide some indication of the populations addressed. If minority parties which publish their programs exclusively in the relevant minority language can be presumed to have an inward orientation, the availability of party documents in the language of the majority may point to a concern with communicating with broader segments of the given country’s general population. Finally, the availability of party documents in English (or another widely spoken language not spoken as a native tongue in the country in which the party is registered) suggests a party’s interest in attracting international attention. As will become apparent in the remainder of this section, Magyar political parties in Slovakia, Romania, and Serbia have appealed to minority, majority, and international audiences by publishing most of their program documents in both English and the majority language, as well as in Hungarian. By way of contrast, fewer than half the Albanian political parties in Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia have published their

documents in English, and three of the eight programs treated here are available only in Albanian.³

Magyar political parties

Slovakia

According to the census of 2001, Magyars account for 9.7% of the total population, making them Slovakia's largest minority population (Štatistický úrad Slovenskej republiky 2001). Magyars in Slovakia live concentrated in a largely contiguous strip of land along the country's border with Hungary, constituting a majority in many of the municipalities located within that region. Since its formation in 1998 from the merger of three Magyar political parties which had cooperated in various combinations since 1990, the Magyar Coalition Party (abbreviated MKP in Hungarian, SMK in Slovak) has been the Slovak Magyar population's main political party, participating in the governments formed in 1998 and 2002. Whereas MKP's name makes clear that it is an ethnic party, the parties of which it is composed (which also drew on a Magyar support base) differed in their general political orientation as well as in the radicalism of their specific demands for Slovakia's Magyar minority.⁴

The 2002 *Electoral Program of the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK)* consists of eighteen pages, organized into five sections (Hungarian Coalition Party 2002). Insofar as the *Electoral Program* is available in English (as well as in Hungarian and Slovak), we can surmise that the document has been prepared with foreign readers in mind. Moreover, although MKP's *Program* contains numerous demands with regard to Slovakia's Magyar population in particular, much of the program addresses issues of more general relevance. Also noteworthy is MKP's highlighting of the situation of Slovakia's Romani population under the heading "We are in favour of equal opportunities for minorities."⁵

The first mention of Europe in MKP's *Program* comes in the document's first section, in the statement that "The creation of a society based on knowledge is the

³ As I cannot read Albanian, my analysis of the respective programs of Serbia's Democratic Union of the Valley and Macedonia's Democratic Party of Albanians and National Democratic Party relies on the professional but unofficial translations rendered by Mustafa Peza.

⁴ For details, see Friedman (2005: 383-384).

⁵ "The Hungarian Coalition Party promotes the equalization of the rights of the Roma, in every area. We try for the preparation of such programs, which are based on active participation of the Roma. One of the most important programs related to the development of the Roma is the training of the Roma assistants. After they return back to their community, these specialists can help to organise Roma activities."

European Project.” Also atypical for the parties treated in this paper is MKP’s advocacy of gender equality in terms of European standards: “Equity between the sexes and the elimination of all forms of sexual discrimination represent one of the priorities of the European social policy.” MKP’s line of defense for replacing the system of regional autonomy adopted in 2001 with more ethnically homogenous territorial units, on the other hand, is more orthodox: “The European Union wants to help the economic development of our country mainly through the development of individual regions.”

Adopted approximately two years before Slovakia’s entry into the European Union (EU), MKP’s *Electoral Program* understandably focuses on the accession process: “By joining the European Union, we can ensure the economical⁶ progress of Slovakia and its democratic function, for a long time.” To this end, MKP advocates a decrease in taxes and related financial burdens on all citizens, as well as an increase in the transparency of state organs. In similar fashion, MKP advocates adoption of language legislation consistent with the *European Charter of Minority or Regional Languages*, which Slovakia adopted in 2001.

Romania

The Romanian census of 2002 indicates that Magyars constitute 6.6% of the country’s total population, such that they comprise the Romania’s largest minority (National Institute of Statistics 2005). In terms of geographic distribution, most of Romania’s Magyar population lives in the region of Transylvania, where Magyars account for 19.6% of the population as a whole. Founded in 1989, the Democratic Alliance of Magyars in Romania (RMDSZ in Hungarian, UDMR in Romanian) has participated in governing coalitions from 1996 to 2000 and from 2004 through the present. Like its counterpart in Slovakia, RMDSZ unites multiple political platforms under a common, explicitly Magyar umbrella.

RMDSZ’s 2004 *Dialogue for Autonomy: Electoral Program* consists of 35 pages divided into twelve chapters (Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania 2004). As noted above with regard to MKP, RMDSZ’s *Electoral Program* is available in English (as well as Hungarian and Romanian), suggesting that it was intended for international as well as domestic consumption. While RMDSZ’s

⁶ Here and throughout the paper, where English texts are available I have quoted them directly, without correction or the use of ‘*sic*’.

Program contains more explicitly ethnic content than does the corresponding MKP document, the Alliance generally justifies its claims for minority rights in terms of European standards and values. The *Program* also states explicitly that RMDSZ must convince the Romanian majority that RMDSZ proposes “a modern European project that offers acceptable solutions for themselves as well.”

The Preamble of RMDSZ’s *Electoral Program* accordingly makes immediately clear that EU accession ranks high among the party’s concerns: “For the time being we are Europeans outside Europe. We must return to the history of the civilized world. We must return home, we are on our way, we are on the right road; there is no way back and there can be no return.” Observing that EU accession is favorable to “Transylvanian Hungarian national identity” insofar as a decrease in the significance of national borders can be expected to contribute to Magyar national unity, the *Program* also promises that the form of territorial autonomy which it advocates is consistent with EU standards and practices; “We want neither more, nor less of the chances offered by the Union.” The Alliance makes use of a similar logic in advocating for Hungarian-language primary and secondary education wherever Magyars reside, making explicit reference to the Bologna process “to assure the verticality of instruction in native language” at the university level.

If most of the Alliance’s demands framed in terms of European standards relate specifically to Romania’s Magyar population, this is not always the case. Thus, the introduction to the chapter on “Certainty of Existence and Social Security” notes the need for a higher (general) level of social security as a requirement of integration into the EU. Later in the same chapter, the Alliance calls for “care for handicapped persons according to the regulations of the European Union.” Also worth noting is the Alliance’s advocacy in the chapter entitled “Hungarian Culture – European Culture” for the employment of German specialists (alongside Magyar specialists) to administer historical documents in Transylvanian county centers.

Serbia

Results of the last census conducted in the Republic of Serbia indicate that the Magyar population accounts for 3.91% of the total population (Republic Statistical Office 2002). As is the case in Slovakia and Romania, Magyars constitute the largest minority in the Republic of Serbia. The vast majority of Magyars (98.95%) in Serbia reside in Vojvodina, where the Magyar population constitutes 14.28% of the total. In

contradistinction to their counterparts in Slovakia and Romania, Magyar political parties in the Republic of Serbia have not participated in republic-level government to date. In Vojvodina's provincial parliament, however, the Alliance of Vojvodina Magyars (VMSZ in Hungarian, SVM in Serbian) is a member of the ruling coalition.

Now the strongest Magyar political party in the Republic of Serbia, VMSZ was founded as a citizens' association in 1994 and registered as a political party in 1995. VMSZ's fourteen-page *Programme* of 1998 is divided into eleven headings and is available in English, as well as in Hungarian and Serbian (Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians 1998). Presenting Vojvodina's Magyar minority as "an integral part of the Hungarian nation having historical and cultural links with all those South Slav and other nations [with] whom they have been living together for centuries," VMSZ's *Programme* makes explicit reference to Europe only in calling for a democratic transition in Yugoslavia "according to European civil standards."

If VMSZ is the strongest Magyar political party in the Republic of Serbia, it is not the only party of its type. VMSZ's competitors are the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Magyars (VMDK in Hungarian, DZVM in Serbian) and the Vojvodina Magyar Democratic Party (VMDP in Hungarian, DSVM in Serbian). As (regional) opposition parties, VMDK and VMDP have sometimes combined forces.⁷ Although neither party has a published electoral program, other documents published by the two parties – whether separately or together – provide clear indications of their political demands, as well as of their framing in terms of European standards and values.

Of the documents to be examined here, the oldest is VMDK's 1995 *Magyar autonomy* (Demokratska zajednica vojvođanskih Mađara 1995). In this ten-page document (published in Serbian and Hungarian), VMDK grounds a call for territorial autonomy on the *European Charter of Local Self-Government* (see Council of Europe 1985). Broader references to Europe appear in the document's Preamble, which notes "the efforts of the international community, especially the European Union and the Conference on Yugoslavia" and contains an explicit assumption that "Yugoslavia [...] would like to be a member of the community of democratic European states." In their *Memorandum on the Position of Magyars in Vojvodina in the Year 2004* (published in Serbian and Hungarian), VMDK and VMDP make a more strongly worded call for reform of local government, asserting that "If Serbia truly desires entry into the EU, it

⁷ See, for example, Demokratska stranka vojvođanskih Mađara and Demokratska zajednica vojvođanskih Mađara (2004); Vojvodina Hungarian Democratic Party (2005).

must approach the reorganization of local self-government” (Demokratska stranka vojvođanskih Mađara and Demokratska zajednica vojvođanskih Mađara 2004). Finally, VMDP’s 2005 *Initiative for the Establishment of the Code of Minorities* (published in English, as well as in Serbian and Hungarian) calls for a scheme of personal autonomy in accordance with Andreas Gross’ report to the Council of Europe (2003).

Albanian political parties

Serbia

In the Republic of Serbia (not including Kosovo), ethnic Albanians constitute 0.82% of the total population (Republic Statistical Office 2002). Concentrated in the Preševo Valley of Southern Serbia, 93.43% of Serbia’s ethnic Albanian population lives in the municipalities of Bujanovac, Medveđa and Preševo. Of these three municipalities, ethnic Albanians constitute a majority in two (Bujanovac and Preševo). Although they have boycotted some parliamentary elections and are in any case arguably not a significant factor at the republic level, four Albanian political parties have been active in Southern Serbia. The respective programs of three of these parties are treated below.⁸

Founded in 1990, the Party of Democratic Action (PVD in Albanian, PDD in Serbian) has been Serbia’s strongest Albanian political party, with the mayors of Bujanovac and (until fall 2005) Preševo both representing it. PVD’s four-page electoral program (available in Serbian and Albanian), issued in the year of the party’s founding, sets out the party’s ethnic and regional focus, but does not connect its calls for radical social, economic, and political changes to European standards (Partija demokratskog delovanja 1990). By way of contrast, the nineteen-page *Program* (available only in Albanian) of the Democratic Union of the Valley (BDL in Albanian, DUD in Serbian) makes explicit mention of the EU in demanding the development of democratic processes in the Preševo Valley (Bashkimi Demokratik i Luginës 2004). Moreover, of the BDL *Program*’s approximately 40 sections, one focuses on the importance of the general notions of security defined in the founding documents of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), while

⁸ The author’s written and telephone correspondence with the Preševo-based Democratic Party of Albanians (PDSH in Albanian, DPA in Serbian) between January and April 2006 had not yielded the requested documents by the time of writing.

another pledges the party's unlimited assistance to OSCE monitoring missions with an eye to building stable democratic institutions. In similar fashion, the Movement for Democratic Progress' (LPD in Albanian, PDP in Serbian) four-page *Proposed Program* (in English) advances the position that democratic processes in Preševo, Medveđa, and Bujanovac should be "in accordance with the European democratic standards" (Movement for Democratic Progress 2005). Moreover, the *Proposed Program* refers twice to EU integration as a goal, also stating that the party "accepts the reality of European integration with Albanian nation integrated in Europe equal with the other nations."

Montenegro

By the results of the 2003 census in the Republic of Montenegro, ethnic Albanians comprise 5.03% of the total population (Zavod za statistiku Crne Gore 2004). Concentrated in the south of the Republic, ethnic Albanians form a majority in the municipality of Ulcinj. In the Republic's parliament, Albanian political parties currently hold two (of 75) seats, with the Democratic Union of Albanians (UDSH in Albanian, DUA in Serbian) and the Democratic Union of Montenegro (LDMZ in Albanian, DSCG in Serbian) splitting the mandates after running together in an electoral coalition in the 2002 parliamentary elections. While neither party has a published electoral program, UDSH's *Accord on the Political and Legal Frameworks of the National Communities which Live in Montenegro* contains both minority rights claims and appeals to putative European values (Demokratska unija Albanaca 2000).⁹

Consisting of eight pages divided into ten sections in the Serbian-language version, the *Accord* has thus far been signed only by the party which proposed it, UDSH. Estimating the Montenegrin government to be willing to open a public debate on the issues raised in the document, the *Accord's* introductory section notes that "This document would open to Montenegro the road toward European and regional integration." Additionally, this same section contains the observation that the solutions proposed in the document are consistent with the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and the *European Convention on Human Rights*, as well as "the positive practice of many countries of Europe: [Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark and others]" (brackets in original).

⁹ As was the case with the Preševo-based Democratic Party of Albanians, the author's ongoing correspondence with LDMZ had not yielded the requested documents by the time of writing.

Macedonia

The census conducted in the Republic of Macedonia in 2002 indicates that ethnic Albanians constitute 25.2% of the country's general population (State Statistical Office 2003: 19). This figure makes ethnic Albanians not only the largest minority in Macedonia, but also the largest Albanian minority in the region.¹⁰ In addition to constituting an absolute majority in several of Macedonia's larger municipalities, ethnic Albanians also live in significant concentrations in and around the cities of Skopje and Kumanovo. Held in 2002, the last round of parliamentary elections in Macedonia resulted in mandates for four Albanian political parties: the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PPD in Albanian, PDP in Macedonian), the Democratic Party of Albanians (PDSH in Albanian, DPA in Macedonian), the Democratic Union for Integration (BDI in Albanian, DUI in Macedonian), and the National Democratic Party (PDK in Albanian, NDP in Macedonian).

After participating in two governments with the (ethnic Macedonian) Social Democratic Union of Macedonia, the Party for Democratic Prosperity has arguably been a relatively minor factor among Albanian political parties since the parliamentary elections of 1998. In its most recent program document, which consists of 26 pages divided into four sections and was published in Albanian and Macedonian in 1999, PPD promises to work "for a Europeanization of Macedonia and for her integration in Europe" (Sobranie na Partijata za demokratski prosperitet 1999). Slightly more concrete is PPD's call for the Europeanization of Macedonian legislation in such a way as to honor the country's accepted international obligations. Most concrete, however, is PPD's grounding of its proposal for decentralization in the *European Charter on Local Self-Government*.

Formed following the parliamentary elections of 1998 by the merger of two Albanian political parties, the Democratic Party of Albanians participated in the government formed by the International Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity in the aftermath of those same elections. PDSH's most recent program document is its 2002 *Electoral Program*, which was published only in Albanian (Partia Demokratike Shqiptare 2002). Consisting of 35 pages divided into nine sections, PDSH's *Program* contains not only

¹⁰ This statement is premised on the effective removal of Kosovo (where ethnic Albanians constitute the majority) from the Republic of Serbia by UN Resolution 1244.

the highest level of technical detail, but arguably also the sharpest rhetoric of all the documents examined here. While movement in the direction of the EU may well be implicit in the motto “We seek the West” on the *Program*’s cover, clearer references to Europe come in the sections on education, social policy, and foreign policy.

Whereas in the first case the appeal comes in the form of a promise to work toward the transformation of the Macedonia’s educational system in accordance with European standards, PDSH’s claim with regard to social policy is that the ongoing expansion of the EU requires that the relevant Macedonian legislation be brought into conformity with its EU counterparts. With regard to foreign policy, on the other hand, PDSH states that its strategic orientation is integration into Western structures, emphasizing the EU as well as NATO.

Tracing its lineage to the National Liberation Army,¹¹ the Democratic Union for Integration emerged from the first parliamentary elections following the armed conflict of 2001 as the dominant political party among Macedonia’s ethnic Albanian population, forming a government with the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia following the parliamentary elections of 2002. The party’s pedigree notwithstanding, BDI’s demands are substantively similar not only to those of the National Liberation Army, but also the demands of PPD and PDSH. In its two-page *Declaration of 2002* (published in English as well as in Albanian and Macedonian), BDI pledges full implementation of the internationally brokered *Framework Agreement* and to create a stable, multiethnic Macedonia, as well as to “integrate Macedonia into the Euro-Atlantic structures starting with regional integration according to the most advanced European and world standards” (Baskhimi Demokratik për Integrim 2002).

Since its formation in spring 2001, the somewhat marginal National Democratic Party (PDK in Albanian, NDP in Macedonian) is best known for its proposal of a federal solution for Macedonia. PDK’s four-page *Political Platform* is available only in Albanian and is divided into ten sections, with appeals to Europe contained in four (Partia Demokratike Kombëtare 2003). In the section on defense and security, the *Platform* notes that Macedonia’s security can be guaranteed only to the extent that the country orients itself toward “European and Euro-Atlantic”

¹¹ In 2002, the Macedonian-language version of BDI’s website made the link between armed group and political party clear in the first sentence: “We who knew how to wage war also know how to wage peace” (Baskhimi Demokratik për Integrim 2002). The same text refers to “the glorious struggle of our people organized in the UÇK,” making use of the Albanian abbreviation for the National Liberation Army (abbreviated ‘ONA’ in Macedonian), an abbreviation more familiar to the Macedonian reading public as that of the Kosovo Liberation Army.

structures. In the section on the political order, on the other hand, PDK asserts that the adoption of consensus democracy would help to speed Macedonia's integration into the EU, as well as NATO. A separate section entitled "Europe" notes that the integration process requires new European standards, norms, and rules different from those characteristic of the Balkans. Finally, in the section on human and civil rights, PDK declares itself in favor of these "in accordance with the conventions and norms valid in the European Union."

COMPLEMENTING "EUROPE"

While the exposition above should be sufficient to demonstrate that Magyar and Albanian minority political parties often frame their claims in terms of European standards, these are not the only values to which parties of either ethnicity appeal. The purpose of this section is to provide a brief look at some of the other ways in which Magyar and Albanian parties present their demands and goals. As will become apparent in the exposition below, the parties' claims not directly related to Europe are not generally in conflict with their use of ideas about Europe, such that the various sets of claims complement one another. A possible exception to this generalization comes from Macedonia, where advocacy of violence and of European integration seem to coexist in the respective programs of some of the Albanian political parties.

Foreign referents

In three of the party programs examined above, NATO receives mention in the same sentence as the EU, with the Magyar Coalition Party of Slovakia and both the Democratic Party of Albanians and the National Democratic Party of Macedonia making explicit reference to NATO in their respective electoral programs (see Hungarian Coalition Party 2002; Partia Demokratike Kombëtare 2003; Partia Demokratike Shqiptare 2002). In similar fashion, Albanian political parties in Macedonia commonly refer to a "Euro-Atlantic" integration, thus combining EU accession with membership in NATO (see Baskhimi Demokratik për Integrim 2002; Partia Demokratike Kombëtare 2003; Partia Demokratike Shqiptare 2002).¹² Also receiving relatively frequent mention among Albanian political parties as embodying and promoting values similar to those of the EU are the United States: Whereas the

¹² Slovakia's Hungarian Coalition Party (2002) also makes one such reference.

National Democratic Party of Macedonia refers to the US as a guarantor of the *Framework Agreement* alongside the EU, the Democratic Union of the Valley and the Movement for Democratic Progress (both of Southern Serbia) hold up the US (along with the EU) as a bearer of the highest standards of Western democracies and of “European democratic standards,” respectively (see Bashkimi Demokratik i Luginës 2004; Movement for Democratic Progress 2005; Partia Demokratike Kombëtare 2003).

Moving further afield, the “international community” receives explicit mention in the Vojvodina Magyar Democratic Party’s letter to the President, Premier, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, with VMDP announcing its intention to contact the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the future status process for Kosovo “to find a democratic solution for the attainment of a genuine autonomy for the Hungarians in Serbia” (Vojvodina Hungarian Democratic Party 2005). The Movement for Democratic Progress (2005), on the other hand, calls for the Preševo-Medveđa-Bujanovac region to be placed under international supervision “in order to realise the equal rights of all inhabitants no matter of their race, religion, nation, or regional corresponding.” Implicit reference to an international community comes in the respective program documents of Macedonia’s Democratic Union for Integration and Democratic Party of Albanians, with the former stating that the war waged by the National Liberation Army “reached international understanding” and the latter qualifying the culmination of the armed conflict of 2001 in the *Framework Agreement* as an indication that the Albanian cause in the conflict was just (Bashkimi Demokratik për Integrim 2002; Partia Demokratike Shqiptare 2002). By way of contrast, the Alliance of Vojvodina Magyars mentions the World Health Organization as an institution with which links should be fostered (Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians 1998), while the Democratic Union of Albanians of Montenegro refers to the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (as mentioned above, on page 11).

Domestic referents

In addition to presenting demands and goals in terms of international institutions and standards, some of the parties covered here ground their programs in features of their own respective countries. Among these features, the relationship between ethnic diversity and the state features prominently as a point of leverage.

Thus, the Magyar Coalition Party asserts that “Slovakia is a multi-national and multi-cultural state” (Hungarian Coalition Party 2002). The Democratic Alliance of Magyars in Romania (2004) makes the same point in less direct fashion, stating that “The Hungarians in Romania belong to the community of Romanian citizens,” and that “There is no need to establish a little Hungarian national state in the large Romanian national state.” The Alliance of Vojvodina Magyars and the Vojvodina Magyar Democratic Party offer similar rejections of the nation-state, with the former claiming “We do not want a separate state, nor a state within a state” and the latter noting that “Hungarian people in Vojvodina are a part of the pluralistic, multinational Yugoslav society” (Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians 1998; Vojvodina Hungarian Democratic Party 2005). In its call for recognition of the Preševo Valley as “a specific ethnical territory” as well as in its promise to engage not only for Albanians, but also for Serbs, Roms, and Turks in the Preševo-Medveđa-Bujanovac region, the Movement for Democratic Progress (2005), too, appeals to ethnic diversity as a value, while the Party for Democratic Prosperity lists among its “fundamental political demands” “a state and institutional structure which reflect the multiethnic reality of Macedonia” (Sobranie na Partijata na demokratski prosperitet 1999). Somewhat different from the positions of the other parties noted under this heading is that of the Democratic Party of Albanians, which expresses ambivalence as to whether the Republic of Macedonia should be conceived as multiethnic or binational (Partia Demokratike Shqiptare 2002).

Related to yet distinct from statements about the reflection of ethnic diversity in political institutions are minority political parties’ presentation of themselves and their constituencies as loyal to the state in which they live. In its 1995 proposal for autonomy, for example, the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Magyars notes that territorial autonomy not only does not pose a threat to Serbia’s territorial integrity, but also binds the citizen more firmly to the state (Demokratska zajednica vojvođanskih mađara 1995). A more recent document sees the Vojvodina Magyar Democratic Party and the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Magyars drawing a sharp line of contrast between Magyars in Vojvodina and Albanians in Kosovo, stating of their own group that “even in the hardest times they have used only democratically acceptable methods of political struggle for the realization of rights” (Demokratska stranka vojvođanskih mađara and Demokratska zajednica vojvođanskih mađara

2004). This being the case, the two parties claim, Vojvodina Magyars have more in common with Kosovo Serbs than with Kosovo Albanians.¹³

If Magyars in Vojvodina have demonstrated a concern with pointing out their loyalty to the institutions of the existing state, they have not been the only ones so concerned. For their part, one Albanian party each in the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro advances a similar assertion, with the Democratic Union of the Valley claiming to realize its goals in accordance with standing legislation and the Democratic Union of Albanians stating repeatedly that nothing proposed in its *Accord* poses a threat to Montenegrin territorial integrity and sovereignty (Bashkimi Demokratik i Luginës 2004; Demokratska unija Albanaca 2000). More ambiguous is the position of the Party of Democratic Action, which seems to make its loyalty contingent on the way in which the state is constituted; recognizing the integrity of Serbia “where all citizens and nationalities will be completely equal in rights,” PVD promises to engage for the integrity of Yugoslavia “as a community of citizens and nationalities completely equal in rights” (Partija demokratskog delovanja 1990).

Domesticating the foreign in Macedonia

Insofar as the current *Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia* is heavily influenced by the internationally brokered *Framework Agreement*, expressions of loyalty to the state in its present institutional configuration blur the distinction between the domestic and the international (cf. Framework Agreement 2001; Služben vesnik na Republika Makedonija 2001). Also contributing to the lack of clarity in the Macedonian case is the fact that the first sentence of the *Framework Agreement's* Preamble presents “more integrated relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the Euro-Atlantic community” as one of the chief purposes of the document. Consequently, a commitment to Macedonia’s 2001 *Constitution* implies a commitment to European integration, with the Democratic Union for Integration’s link between “our war” and the *Framework Agreement* further suggesting that violence and European standards are not after all incompatible (Baskhimi Demokratik për Integrim 2002; cf. Framework Agreement 2001, Article 1.1). For its part, the Democratic Party of Albanians also claims much of the credit for the *Framework*

¹³ As a parting shot of sorts, VM DP and VM DK combine an assertion of commonality with an appeal to Europe in the claim that “small nations like the Magyars and the Serbs [...] can survive only if they adapt to the standards which apply in the European Union.”

Agreement, which it presents as the most important accomplishment of Macedonia's Albanian population (Partia Demokratike Shqiptare 2002). Finally, the National Democratic Party asserts its recognition of the *Framework Agreement*, referring in the same sentence to the US and the EU as the document's major guarantors (Partia Demokratike Kombëtare 2003).

TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS

“Lucid and civilized Europeans” versus “gun-toting revolutionaries”?

Returning briefly to the questions motivating the comparison between Magyar and Albanian political parties in the first place, there seem to be no grounds for a general conclusion that Magyar political parties exhibit a greater variety of programmatic commitments than do their Albanian counterparts. Moreover, even the contention that Albanian parties in Macedonia differ only in their degree of radicalism with regard to issues of minority rights is no longer to be justified in light of developments within the Albanian party system in that country since the conclusion of the armed conflict of 2001. An illustration of this change is the Democratic Party of Albanians' devotion of the longest section of its 2002 *Electoral Platform* to economic issues (see Partia Demokratike Shqiptare 2002).

As for Lord's comparison of the Magyar diaspora with other minorities, while the Democratic Alliance of Magyars in Romania's presentation of Magyars' return to Europe (cited above) provides a fine example – consistent with Lord's observation about Magyars' attractiveness as “lucid and civilized Europeans” – of a political party packaging itself for international consumption, political parties of Albanian minorities vary more in their self-presentation before domestic and international audiences, with some parties explicitly linking themselves to groups which Lord might well call “gun-toting revolutionaries.” Thus, whereas the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Magyars and the Vojvodina Magyar Democratic Party draw an explicit distinction between Magyars in Vojvodina and Albanians in Kosovo, the (ethnic Albanian) Democratic Union of the Valley and the Movement for Democratic Progress make approving references to the Liberation Army of Preševo, Medveđa, and Bujanovac, a guerilla movement which favored the secession of those municipalities from Serbia and their annexation to Kosovo (see Bashkimi Demokratik i Luginës 2004; Movement for Democratic Progress 2005). In similar fashion, Macedonia's Democratic Union for Integration draws a direct line between itself and the National Liberation Army

(see above, page 13). By way of contrast, Montenegro's Democratic Union of Albanians makes no mention of the conflicts in Southern Serbia and Kosovo, taking a conciliatory approach to the Montenegrin government while appealing to European standards (see *Demokratska Unija Albanaca* 2000)

Generalizability

The preceding analysis of Magyar and Albanian party programs yields partial answers to questions about whether a given minority tends to mobilize in a uniform way across all states in which it constitutes a numerically significant population and whether numerically significant minorities in a given state tend to mobilize in the same fashion. With regard to the first of these questions, the answer is not only partial, but also ambiguous: Magyar political parties in Slovakia, Romania, and Serbia seem to mobilize in largely similar fashion, while differences among Albanian political parties in Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia make generalization more difficult. More specifically, whereas the Magyar parties examined in the course of the comparison have in common their appeals to ethnic diversity (as well as to European standards), parties of Albanian minorities are divided by their expressed positions with respect to armed groups operating outside the formal political arena.

The findings of the analysis on the question of uniform mobilization by all numerically significant minorities in a given state are more straightforward, if not necessarily applicable for all states. Of the political systems treated here, that of the Republic of Serbia provides the most appropriate basis for addressing this question, as Serbia is home to both Magyar and Albanian minorities. In this case, however, a comparison between Magyar and Albanian mobilization is rendered unnecessary by differences in the stated positions of Albanian parties in Serbia with respect not only to armed groups, but also to Serbia's territorial integrity (cf. *Movement for Democratic Progress* 2005; *Partija demokratskog delovanja* 1990). Moreover, these same differences among Albanian political parties in Serbia demonstrate that we should not automatically expect even that all parties of a given minority within a given state will mobilize in similar ways.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians. 1998. *Programme*. Subotica: Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians.
- Bashkimi Demokratik i Luginës. 2004. *Programi*. Preševo: Bashkimi Demokratik i Luginës.
- Bashkimi Demokratik për Integrim. 2002. Web page [accessed 3 March 2003]. Available at www.bdi-press.org.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 1996. *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Council of Europe. 1985. *European Charter of Local Self-Government*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.
- _____. 2003. *Positive Experiences of Autonomous Regions as a Source of Inspiration for Conflict Resolution in Europe*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.
- Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania . 2004. *Dialogue for Autonomy: Electoral Program*. Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania.
- Demokratska stranka vojvođanskih Mađara, and Demokratska zajednica vojvođanskih Mađara. 2004. *Memorandum o položaju Mađara u Vojvodina 2004. godine*. Subotica: Demokratska zajednica vojvođanskih Mađara.
- Demokratska unija Albanaca. 2000. *Sporazum o političkim i pravnim okvirima samouprave nacionalnih zajednica koje žive u Crnoj Gori*. Ulcinj: Demokratska unija Albanaca.
- Demokratska zajednica vojvođanskih Mađara. 1995. *Mađarska autonomija*. Subotica: Demokratska zajednica vojvođanskih Mađara.
- Framework Agreement. 2001. "Framework Agreement." Web page [accessed 10 March 2003]. Available at www.president.gov.mk/eng/info/dogovor.htm.
- Friedman, Eben. 2005. Electoral System Design and Minority Representation in Slovakia and Macedonia. *Ethnopolitics* 4, no. 4: 381-96.
- Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Hungarian Coalition Party. 2002. *Electoral Program of the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK)*. Bratislava: Hungarian Coalition Party.
- International Crisis Group. 2001. *The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion*. Skopje and Brussels: International Crisis Group.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1977. *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

- Lord, Christopher. 1993. The International Perspective. *The Hungarian Minority*. Ed. Pavol Frič, Fedor Gál, Peter Hunčík, and Christopher Lord. Prague: Institute of Social and Political Science.
- Movement for Democratic Progress. 2005. *Proposed Program of LPD*. Bujanovac: Movement for Democratic Progress.
- National Institute of Statistics. 2005. "Population by Ethnic Groups, Mother Tongue and Areas." Web page [accessed 10 April 2006]. Available at <http://www.insse.ro/RPL2002INS/vol5/tables/t16.pdf>.
- Official Gazette of Romania. 1996. Law on Political Parties. *Monitorul Oficial*, no. 87. English translation available online at <http://www.legislationline.org/legislation.php?tid=57&lid=728>.
- Partia Demokratike Kombëtare. 2003. *Politická platforma na NDP*. Skopje: Partia Demokratike Kombëtare.
- Partia Demokratike Shqiptare. 2002. *Izborna platforma na DPA*. Tetovo: Partia Demokratike Shqiptare.
- Partija demokratskog delovanja. 1990. Preševo: Partija demokratskog delovanja.
- Republic Statistical Office. 2002. Population by National or Ethnic Groups, Gender and Age Groups in the Republic of Serbia, by Municipalities. *Communication*, no. 295.
- Služben vesnik na Republika Makedonija. 2001. Amandmani IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVII i XVIII na Ustavot na Republika Makedonija. *Služben vesnik na Republika Makedonija*, no. 91.
- Sobranie na Partijata za demokratski prosperitet. 1999. *Programski opredelbi*. Tetovo: Partija za demokratski prosperitet.
- State Statistical Office. 2003. Release. *Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia, 2002*, no. 2.1.3.30. Available online at <http://www.stat.gov.mk/pdf/10-2003/2.1.3.30.pdf>.
- Štatistický úrad Slovenskej republiky. 2001. "Sčítanie obyvateľov, domov a bytov 26. mája 2001: Základné údaje." Web page [accessed 11 December 2001]. Available at www.statistics.sk.
- Vojvodina Hungarian Democratic Party. 2005. *Initiative for the Establishment of the Code of Minorities*. Temerin: Vojvodina Hungarian Democratic Party.
- Vidomosti Verhovnoi Rady. 2001. Zakon Ukraïny pro polityčni partyï v Ukraïni. *Vidomosti Verhovnoi Rady*, no. 23.
- Zavod za statistiku Crne Gore. 2004. "Population by Nationality or Ethnic Affiliation by Censuses 1981, 1991, and 2003." Web page [accessed 6 April 2006]. Available at <http://www.monstat.cg.yu/Godisnji%20podaci/GODINA2004/Stanovnistvo20>

04/EngGradjani2004.htm.